Low-income, publicly insured admissions historically cost more to treat than the average patient. To ensure that hospitals are reimbursed an adequate amount for care of indigent populations, Medicare reimburses hospitals an additional percentage amount according to federally set financial schedule. The reimbursement cutoff is discrete: at fifteen percent of a disproportionate patient percentage, a hospital is reimbursed an extra 2.5 percent of the standard prospective payment rate. I extend a simple model of hospital quality as a function of insurance reimbursement increases to determine that under certain circumstances there exists a positive relationship between quality and reimbursement. I use Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems data to analyze hospital ratings around the fifteen percent disproportionate patient percentage cutoff and find that on average, hospital ratings increase by nine percent. When a subsample of non-profit hospitals is analyzed, hospital ratings increase by an average of ten percent, primarily driven by patient facility cleanliness and medical provider communication ratings.
Introduction
For the same illness, low-income patients are more costly to treat than those who are not indigent. To compensate hospitals for the difference in the cost of care between patients, Medicare reimburses hospitals with greater than 15 percent low-income patient admissions an additional percentage of the prospective payment rate. I analyze patient-reported hospital ratings to determine whether funds that should be allocated toward patient care are being used for this purpose.
Twenty-six percent of a hospital's admissions are, on average, low-income patients. This percentage is called a hospital's "disproportionate share," and a hospital's Medicare reimbursement rate directly depends on this percentage. Hospitals that qualify for the disproportionate share reimbursement can expect, on average, to receive an additional 2-3 million dollars yearly from Medicare. Federal Medicare disproportionate share spending reached 9.1 billion dollars in 2009 1 : more than 75 percent of acute-care hospitals in the United States qualified for these funds. Of debate in the economics literature is whether the money is used for patient care: most disproportionate share research examines the impact of additional reimbursement on hospital mortality rates. Using patient satisfaction scores instead of mortality rates, I am able to determine whether patients treated at hospitals that qualify for Medicare disproportionate share payments (DSH) receive different care than those who do not.
Hospital quality and effective use of funds are typically measured using patient outcome data. Until recently, this measure has been the best available data for hospital quality research, despite the fact that patients who are severely ill may choose different hospitals than the less ill (Cutler et al., 2004) . Using patient mortality and hospital financial data, Duggan (2000) finds that not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals in California that qualified for Medicaid disproportionate share payments saw no drop in infant mortality rates, but instead increased their financial holdings dollar for dollar. Baicker and Staiger (2006) find that public hospitals that receive
Medicaid DSH funds see a slight decrease in infant and heart attack mortality rates. Lindrooth et al. (2006) uses staffing decisions instead of patient outcomes in a study of the effects of the Balanced Budget Act on safety-net hospitals 2 . When hospital revenues were adversely affected by a change in reimbursement rates, non-safety-net (non-DSH) hospitals reduce nursed staffing by approximately 6 percent and no significant effect was found for DSH hospitals. My study differs from previous work in two fundamental ways: hospital patient experience data are used instead of hospital mortality ratings or staffing ratios and only the Medicare DSH program is evaluated instead of jointly with a state's Medicaid DSH program.
The data used in my study are not new to the medical and health services literature.
Countless health services research articles use data from the recent United States Center for
Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) Physician, Nursing Home, and Hospital Compare programs. Lehrman et al. (2009) provides qualitative analysis that describes the correlations between hospital characteristics and hospital performance on clinical process scores and patient experience measures. They find that small and large hospitals (fewer than 100 beds or greater than 200 beds), non-profit hospitals, and northeastern and mid-western hospitals perform in the top quartile of both patient experience and clinical process measures. The closest research to this study, Werner et al. (2008) use the first three years of the Hospital Compare clinical process data to determine how disproportionate share hospital payment affect hospital performance on clinical process quality measures. The authors separate hospitals with high and low (40% and 5%, respectively) Medicaid patient percentages, and simulate the effect of a change in reimbursement 2 A safety net hospital is one that treats a large volume of Medicaid or Medicare/SSI patients and in most cases is eligible to receive both Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share funds.
on the hospital process quality measures. They find that from 2004 to 2006, safety-net hospitals show a smaller performance increase than non-safety-net hospitals. In the health economics literature, Werner et al. (2012) , implements a difference in differences strategy using the The calculation of the disproportionate share percentage is as follows: (2000) and Baicker and Staiger (2005) find that government ownership and an increased budget constraint, which intuitively and fundamentally should provide a higher quality of service to those most in need, does not guarantee that a change in treatment is offered.
Examining revenue changes before and after the California Medicaid DSH program went into effect, Duggan (2000) finds that every Medicaid DSH dollar received by public hospitals was reclaimed by the state. As a result, Duggan (2000) 2) Altruism: Non-profit firms (or the managers and contributors to the non-profit firms) may be considered more altruistic than for-profit firms. Rose-Ackerman (1996) discusses that the utility functions of those who manage non-profits may result in an allocation of resources to activities or services which may not be provided in a for-profit environment.
Donors to (and managers of) non-profits may be incentivized by both a "warm glow" (the feeling of well-being when one contributes to a charitable cause), or prestige (others know that one has contributed to a charitable cause). Either motivation yields the same result: services or resources provided to an institution that does not redistribute the funds back to owners (Harbaugh, 1998) . Duggan (2000) tests the "altruism" theory by measuring the change in costs of care after a change in DSH status of hospitals with different ownership. If a non-profit hospital is more altruistic, then one would expect to see an increase in the cost of operating a hospital -DSH funds may be allocated to purchasing new equipment, hiring more expensive (better) doctors, and so forth. Instead of an increase in the cost of operation, Duggan (2000) finds that the Medicaid DSH funds are directed to hospital financial holdings and assets.
3) Ease of access to profits: As previously discussed, non-profit hospitals are legally barred from accessing directly any net profit that the non-profit hospital may acquire. Instead, the non-profit or public firm may spend the extra resources on quality of care Hansmann, 1980) . From the previous paragraph, Duggan (2000) empirically finds that this is not the case for non-profit hospitals.
Theoretical Model
To theoretically ascertain the effect of additional reimbursement on hospital quality, I rely on previous work by Lindrooth, Bazzoli, and Clement (2006) , Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) and Meltzer, Chung, and Basu (2002) for the presented theory. I consider a utility maximizing hospital where utility is a function of both profit and quality:
Equation (3) is the hospital's utility function, which can vary by hospital. Equation (4), the profit function, is a function of hospital quality (Q) and patient illness severity (S): M(Q) is the revenue from publicly insured patients (through Medicare or Medicaid) and O(Q) is the revenue from "other" insurance types. I directly include quality in the hospital utility function because non-profit hospitals may derive additional utility from providing high quality services. I keep separate the costs of patient severity and care quality: the cost of treatment of a severely ill patient is fundamentally separate from the cost of basic customer service. If one were to consider two nurses, identical in skill of patient care, but one with a more pleasing bedside manner than the other, the difference in wages between the two nurses could be argued to reflect the difference in the nurses' "people skills." Hospital quality must be positive or zero, and profits are constrained by a floor condition, with the assumption being that if profits are below the floor, the hospital either closes or merges with another institution.
I can substitute (4) into (3) and solve for first order conditions:
One can totally differentiate the first order conditions to find the change in quality of care when DSH payments increase, under the basic assumptions that the revenue functions from publicly and privately insured patients are concave with respect to quality and that the cost function is convex with respect to quality (
As discussed in Lindrooth et. al, (2006) and Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) , when the budget constraint is binding, the hospital will choose to offer zero quality. That is, when a hospital has no excess profit, no money will be allocated toward increasing hospital quality. An explicit assumption in order to arrive at Equation 8 is that the ratio of utilities with respect to quality and profit in Equation 7 must be constant.
The model indicates that when price or Medicare percentage increase, a hospital's average quality offered will increase as a result. The model cannot address whether a different quality of care is offered to different patients.
Data
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) makes publicly available on its website the impact files for each fiscal year. 9 The impact files contain hospital-aggregated data for each individual hospital fiscal year. The data includes information needed for Medicare reimbursement adjustment, as well as demographic information that I use for control variables. During the year, a random sample of patients is contacted after their hospital visits to answer surveys about their stays. The patients are asked ten questions regarding their hospital stays; each hospital collects the data and reports it to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. The aggregated data are made publicly available by hospital which allows me to construct an average overall rating for the hospital and to analyze the hospital rating by specific measure. The questions asked are located in Table 3 : I ultimately use for analysis the percentage of patients who responded that the hospital scored "high" or "very good" in a category. For brevity, I call these percentages "hospital ratings." An easy example is room cleanliness: a patient has a choice of three options when asked about how often her room was clean during her stay. The choices are: "always," "sometimes," or "never" clean. The Hospital Compare data reports the percentages of patients who answer affirmatively in each category: if a hospital treated three patients, and all answer in different ways to the "room cleanliness" question (one says "never", another says "sometimes", the last says "always"), then the hospital rating is calculated to be 33 percent. If instead two patients answer that their room was "always" clean, while the third says that the room was "never clean," then the calculated rating jumps to 66 percent.
Demographic Variables

Disproportionate Patient Percentage:
A hospital is designated as a "disproportionate share hospital" if the percentage of lowreimbursement patients (Medicaid patients and Medicare patients who quality for supplemental security income) exceeds fifteen percent. At the end of the year a hospital receives additional funds from Medicare for patient care if the hospital exceeds the fifteen percent threshold.
Teaching Status:
Hospitals with teaching programs receive additional Medicare adjustments to the base prospective payment rate set by Medicare. The adjustments are meant to compensate for the "learning curve" of residents -diagnostics and equipment may be used at a greater rate than would be expected due to the learning environment of the hospital. Despite this, teaching hospitals are considered to be the forefront of the medical field and may perform better on the measure scores than would otherwise be expected. A dummy variable that captures the teaching status of the hospital accounts for fundamental environmental differences in the hospital.
Hospitals do not change teaching hospital status during the time frame that I analyze, but may change the number of residents in the program. To account for this in later analysis, I separate teaching hospitals from non-teaching to account for any systematic differentiation in quality scores.
Medicare patient days to total days:
Ultimately, a hospital's reimbursement rate from Medicare rests on the number of number of Medicare patients admitted and whether it admits any Medicare patients at all. If a hospital does not admit Medicare patients, a difference in the reimbursement rate would make no difference to the reimbursement that a hospital would receive if it were above or below the cutoff.
Operating and capital costs to Medicare covered charges ratio:
This number is an indication of how costly the operations (capital and labor) of the hospital are -A number less than one indicates that the standard hospital operating costs for care are greater than the amount reimbursed by Medicare for care provided, while a number greater than one would indicate that the hospital is making a profit from operations. These variables act as proxies for different hospital operating environments; it is reasonable to assume that these variables will capture differences in hospital equipment and competence of staff.
Average daily census and total number of cases:
These variables capture the difference in aptitude of taking care of a great deal of patients; size and number of patients seen may increase the proficiency with which hospitals treat patients. Conversely, it is possible that an overcrowding of patients may decrease the approval rating of the hospital. The average daily census is the average number of patients seen per day in the hospital, while the total number of cases is transfer adjusted -only the patients who stay in the hospital are counted. Neither measure depends on patient insurer.
Estimation
Identification in a regression-discontinuity design rests on the assumption that, barring complete agent manipulation, the likelihood of an observation falling on either side of the cutoff is random. In the case of hospital qualification for DSH funding, hospitals are able to target potential patients but are unable to completely manipulate their disproportionate patient percentage (Duggan, 2000) . I include in the robustness checks a test for hospital selection into the Medicare DSH program.
I explicitly assume that when hospitals are within a certain percentage of the disproportionate share hospital qualification cutoff, the allocation of the DSH funds can be treated as exogenous because these hospitals are "close" in their disproportionate patient percentages and are unable to exactly manipulate this variable. Later, I show the effects of DSH status as the percentage from the DSH cutoff changes.
The regression discontinuity design is estimated in a similar fashion as the difference-indifferences setup but executes a different strategy for identifying a control group. The hospitals that fall short of the DSH cutoff are considered to be the counterfactual of the hospitals directly to the right of the cutoff; the assumption that the differences between the hospitals above and below the cutoff are either observable and that unobservable characteristics are time-invariant allows me to identify the impact of the DSH funds.
I use hospital ratings as a dependent variable to determine whether hospitals that receive a DSH reimbursement are using extra resources in a significantly different way that hospitals that are just below the cutoff. The bandwidth is determined using non-parametric cross validation methods as described in Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) . Nonparametrically, I determine the ideal "distance" away from the cutoff of fifteen percent by selecting from a range of bandwidths and fitting an estimated curve to the data both above and below the cutoff. The bandwidth that yielded the lowest mean squared errors within a restricted sample of five percentage points above and below the cutoff was chosen as the "optimal" bandwidth.
I repeat the procedure for the full sample and then for the subsample of non-profit hospitals. Bandwidths of two and three percentage points are chosen for both samples. All of the following tables report estimates using the three percent bandwidth selection, unless explicitly stated otherwise. I do not repeat the analysis for for-profit and public hospitals due to small sample sizes. Table 2) .
To address concerns about unobserved hospital characteristics such as initial reputation, span of medical services, presence and size of teaching programs, etc., I include hospital-specific fixed effects. Concerns about hospital adaptation to scores and cross-subsidization across hospital services (David et al., 2011) may exist if a several-year panel of data were analyzed. For this reason, I specifically limit the data to the span of five quarters: I make the assumption that if a hospital's resource allocations changes in response to the HCACPS, the hospital responses are gradual and lagged after the public reports of the scores are released. However, to control for wide variation on both sides of the cutoff, I include provider time trends. I include time dummies as additional controls.
The initial estimating equation is: I average all ratings to determine whether hospitals just above or below the DSH cutoff have higher ratings on average than those below the cutoff. The ratings can also be separated by individual question. I repeat the same analysis for the overall ratings and for the category ratings.
Additional analysis includes the covariates previously discussed:
A testable implication provided by the model is that hospitals with a large Medicare population, or "bite," will have a greater increase in quality than those with a low Medicare population, all else equal. Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is mixed: Kaestner and Guardardo (2008) I conduct a quantile regression analysis to determine the effect of large Medicare populations and Medicare DSH status on average hospital quality. The purpose of this quantile regression estimation is to determine how the effects of a hospital's Medicare population differ across parts of the score distribution. Understandably, if a hospital has a high score, which corresponds to a high percentile in the distribution, the effects of additional reimbursement due to the hospital's Medicare population will be close to zero. Alternatively, for hospitals with low ratings, the additional reimbursement from a high Medicare population may have a larger impact on hospital quality scores than the reimbursement for hospitals with a smaller Medicare 11 A hospital's geographic classification directly affects the hospital's Medicare reimbursement percentage.
population. I estimate the following equation:
The coefficient of interest, 4 , is the effect on quality of Medicare DSH reimbursement due to different hospital Medicare populations. I expect a nonnegative coefficient estimate, and interpret the coefficient as the effect on quality of a larger level of Medicare DSH reimbursement.
I do not include hospital fixed effects in the quantile regressions, but do include basic hospital characteristics: urban, teaching, and ownership dummies. By estimating a quantile regression, I
test whether a large Medicare population affects hospital quality and also whether different quantiles of the score distribution are dissimilarly affected.
Results
All Owners versus Non-Profit
I find that DSH hospital status on average increases the hospital's overall rating in the full sample by six percentage points (Table 4 ). When I stratify by non-profit hospitals in columns 3 and 4, this effect jumps to a little under seven percentage points -which translates to roughly a ten percent increase in average hospital rating. After the inclusion of covariates, this effect remains statistically significant and stable. For the non-profit hospital subsample, the coefficient on the interaction term is strongly negative and significant both before and after the addition of covariates. The cost of an increase of low-income patients may not be fully compensated by the DSH payments, and as a result stretching further the hospital's resources. The positive coefficient on the DPP variable captures a hospital's increasing ability to provide care as the number of challenging cases increases.
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In the categorical regressions for the full sample ( 
Robustness
Hospital Manipulation and Robustness to Bandwidth Selection
Imbens (2008) and Lemieux (2010) discuss that care should be taken when implementing a study that uses a regression discontinuity design. One of the explicit assumptions with the design is that the running variable cannot be fully manipulated, but partial manipulation does not invalidate the experiment. Full manipulation of the running variable renders the experiment invalid, due to selection. The classic example, and the first use, of regression discontinuity is that of a financial award based on student test scores: students are aware of the score cutoff for financial aid and may adjust study behavior accordingly, but are unable to fully control the outcome of the test. The same principle holds for DSH hospital status: hospitals are aware of the cutoff and may target Medicaid and SSI Medicare patients for admission, but ultimately cannot fully control how many patients are admitted to the hospital.
In Figure 1 McCrary's test of manipulation of the running variable formalizes the rejection of hospital manipulation of the disproportionate share percentage. I run the tests at a bandwidth slightly above and at the optimal bandwidth of the non-profit subsample for reassurance that selection does not occur in the immediate vicinity of the optimal bandwidth.
I implement a placebo discontinuity at 12 percent of DPP and find the estimated effect of the placebo cutoff on patient satisfaction surveys and quality scores by running the same local linear regressions with the same bandwidths (Table 8) . On average, I find that the placebo DSH status increases average hospital ratings by a negative 1.2 to a positive 1.7 percentage points, and nothing is statistically significant.
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To ensure that my findings are robust to the choice of bandwidth, I include graphs that illustrate the average effect of DSH status as bandwidth increases (Figures 2-3 ). The effect of DSH status remains greater than zero until approximately 3 percent away from the cutoff. This attenuation could be due to imperfect hospital selection of patients or differences in hospitals due to unobservable variables.
Cross Section versus Fixed Effects
I estimate the effect of DSH status in cross sectional regressions that contain a lagged outcome variable. The coefficient of DSH status in the linear cross-sectional regressions is similar in magnitude (within a percentage point) to the linear fixed-effects regressions and is statistically significant. Inclusion of quadratic and cubic expressions increases both the magnitude and significance of the estimates, but provides implausibly large estimates of the effects of DSH status. This is likely due to the small bandwidth of 3%.
I am comfortable interpreting the fixed-effect regression estimates as unbiased estimates of the true effect of a hospital's DSH status attainment.
Cost Effectiveness
Most medical research compares patient satisfaction in hospitals in a cross-section but cannot provide any causal inference about hospital characteristics and hospital ratings. Despite If I assume that a hospital is reimbursed 5,000 dollars per patient and discharges 6,000 patients per year, then the hospital receives approximately 750,000 dollars in DSH money (the DSH reimbursement is an additional 2.5 percent of the prospective payment rate). The DSH program is relatively more cost-effective in improving patient satisfaction than a program that focuses solely on nurse staffing.
Policy Implications
The disproportionate share adjustment was designed to reimburse hospitals for a higher cost of care for large numbers of the indigent population. However, it appears that a large number of hospitals that receive these funds have higher hospital ratings than those that do not.
This paper reveals that hospitals that are DSH eligible tend to have cleaner patient facilities and better doctor and nurse communication than those who do not receive the funds: evidence presented here suggests that this effect is primarily driven by the quality increase in care
provided by lower performing hospitals after receiving Medicare DSH funds. It is unclear whether hospitals that fall short of the DSH qualifications do not have the resources to maintain proper medical or maintenance staff or whether those hospitals that receive the DSH adjustment are expanding current programs because they are no longer constrained by the cost of current care. Lindrooth et al. (2006) suggests the former. However, one could consider the improvement of hospital service as a response to the attainment of DSH status to be a legitimate hospital response to meet the needs of a higher resource-intensive patient population.
A simple way to test this is to examine yearly hospital cost report data: differences in what hospitals are spending on patients could potentially be found in cost-center level data.
Implications for the Affordable Care Act
The current passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will lead to many more individuals insured through either Medicaid or private insurance. As a direct result of the increase in the number of insured, the federal government plans to reduce, and ultimately, eliminate the Medicare disproportionate share adjustment. The implications for the elimination of the program are unclear: the previous analysis shows that the disproportionate share payments are used, at least in part, by hospitals to increase staff quality. This increase in staff quality could be considered necessary (i.e. hospitals were operating at low staff levels because of an inability to pay salaries) or could be viewed as excessive, in that the DSH payments cover the cost of indigent care and additionally subsidize an expansion of hospital operation.
Conclusion
The historical test of hospital quality has been to examine hospital mortality rates for various conditions. However, the recent availability of consumer satisfaction surveys has allowed for a different, precise, estimation of hospital quality. This research finds that disproportionate share status increases hospital ratings by six percentage points across all owners, jumping to over six percentage points when non-profits are isolated. Extensive robustness checks of these results do not invalidate my findings.
Future research involves hospital cost-center level comparisons of hospitals with DSH status. Standard Deviations in Parentheses. Note: The number of providers on either side of the DSH cutoff is not stationary through time. 
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